Although discourse analysis emerges as a multi-faceted research method reflecting various schools of thought, disciplines and approaches, it is possible to pinpoint some meta-theoretical issues or fundamental assumptions common for most of them. This article aims to investigate different philosophical aspects and theoretical foundations that inform discourse analysis, such as the interplay between epistemological and ontological dimensions or the definition of language itself. Because space does not allow an in-depth discussion of all the theoretical orientations collectively contributing to the development of social constructionist discourse analysis, this paper focuses on poststructuralist, constructivist, and social realist positions, and also attempts to trace the roots of social constructionism in linguistic philosophy, phenomenology, and hermeneutics. Hopefully, this article will provide the opportunity to develop meta-theoretical reflections on discourse analysis, thus striking the balance between the philosophy, methodology and practice.
Introduction
As noted by many discourse theorists, defining discourse analysis is not an easy task (Wood and Kroger 2000: 3; Burman and Parker 1993: 3; Potter and Wetherell 1987: 6; Jaworski and Coupland 1999: 1-14; van Dijk 1997: 1) . The difficulty
Historical developments and theoretical foundations
While attempting to trace the philosophical roots of social constructionist paradigm, some researchers go as far back as to Descartes, a seventeenth-century French philosopher, whose major contribution to philosophy was conceptualizing -the mind‖ as distinct from the human body and the rest of the material world (Holstein and Gubrium 2008: 16, after Rorty 1980) . Descartes formulated the concept by raising doubts about the legitimacy of dominant ideas of his times and questioning the evidence provided by his own senses. Because in Cartesian philosophy the physical world, or external reality, and all the phenomena that occur in it ought to be approached with apprehension of deception, establishing the foundations of genuine knowledge requires engaging in -pure critical reflection‖. This brings us to the point where we can draw an analogy between Descartes's acts of supreme doubting and Lyotard's -incredulity toward metanarratives‖ (Lyotard 1984:xxiv, quoted in Holstein and Gubrium 2008: 16) . Thus, in conceptualising -the mind‖ and in harbouring suspicion of grand theories as a path to true knowledge, Descartes laid the foundations for the social constructionist tradition.However, Descartes's role as a contributor to the constructionist paradigm ends here because his mediations about the mind and reality lack any reference to the workings of language. While he is withdrawn into the acts of doubting, Descartes is oblivious to the idea that language performs various functions, which is one of the basic conceptual principles of the social constructionist tradition that recognises the centrality of language in creating social reality.
Since Descartes, thinkers as diverse as Locke, Kant, Hume, Wittgenstein, Quine, Hegel, Marx, Frankfurt School intellectuals, Dilthey, Weber, Husserl, Gadamer, Derrida, and many others (Holstein and Gubrium 2008: 13-39) , have pondered upon the mind-world relationship where assumptions about the role of language were either left implicit or made explicit. Due to time and space constraints, this paper investigates only those who explicitly theorized language as a social and cultural phenomenon. This is why we skip some centuries and arrive at the beginning of the twentieth century when language came to the fore as the socalled ‗linguistic turn' in the history of philosophy. Coined by Gustav Bergmann (1964) (quoted in Rorty 1992: 9) , an Austrian language philosopher affiliated with the Vienna Circle,the term ‗linguistic turn', which has since left an imprint on all branches of philosophy, signalled the emergence of a new paradigm, in which the language and linguistic analysis become the central issue of philosophy.
Although numerous philosophers have informed the tradition, including GottlobFrege, Bertrand Russell, and Alfred North Whitehead, it is Ludwig Wittgenstein that made the most influential contributions to the development of 158 MarekGralewski The Philosophical Underpinnings of Social Constructionist Discourse Analysis analytic linguistic philosophy. He is credited with introducing ‗the linguistic turn' with his work, TractatusLogico-Philosophicus (1992) , which, according to one of various ways of its periodization, originates the first phase of Wittgenstein's philosophical output (Debrix 2003: 79) . The first phase, embraced by the members of the Vienna Circle, was logical empiricism (also referred to as logical positivism), which rejects the philosopher's desire to gain knowledge about the nature of the world and to investigate reality by dismissing metaphysics. This way, they reduced philosophizing to -the logic of scientific language‖ which entails subjecting all propositions or statements under investigation to the verification criterion of meaning to check whether they have meaning or not (Beaney 2007: 126) . Thereby, the linguistic turn changed philosophy into a -critique of language‖ (Wittgenstein 1992:4.0031) , that is, an attempt to resolve epistemological and ontological problems by studying the conceptual truths inherently connected with the use of language. Finally, one of the fundamental assumptions of logical positivism was that -language was a ‗picture' of the logic of reality‖, that is, it presented the world, in a static and passive way, as a mirror reflection (Debrix 2003: 73) , which constitutes ‗one-to-one relationship between language and the world' (Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips 2006:292) .
The other phase of Wittgensteinian philosophy is associated with his seminal work titled Philosophical Investigations (1958) in which Wittgenstein chose to investigate the myriad ways language works in different contexts as it is used by human beings (Debrix 2003: 76) . With the words, -the meaning of a word is its use in the language‖ (1958:20) , Wittgenstein made a complete departure from the idea of the formal unity of language and of logic, which constituted the fundamental principle underlying logical positivism introduced in Tractatus. First, the assumption of the ‗picturing relationship' between the structure of language and the structure of the world (Baghramian 2005: 98) , also known as representationalism in philosophy of language, could not explain all specific examples of language use. Second, Wittgensteinian revolutionary conception of language entailed a distinct theory of meaning.According to Wittgenstein, meaning and therefore truth, is relative to context, that is, ‗language game', which is another important feature of Wittgenstein's theory of language. Wittgenstein coined this term in order to encapsulate the social, rule-bound and active nature of language and the relational nature of meaning (Wittgenstein 1958: 11) . The language game analogy indicates that there is more to the speaking of a language than meets the eye. The speaking of a language (linguistic behaviour)is inextricably interwoven with shared socially coordinated practicesof human groups, including nonlinguistic activities, that constitute a way of living in society (Ernest 1998:70) , or, to use Wittgenstein's nomenclature (1958:7, 12 ), a -form of life‖. People, whose agency to act within a specific social context is limited by the rules governing it (Debrix 2003: 78) , can engage in multiple games (linguistic activities) to Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1(2011): 155-171 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0007-4 accomplish a purpose or satisfy their needs (Baghramian 2005:99) . However, the rules, whose meanings are regulated and stabilised by social norms, only make sense within a particular context, or given ‗form of life' in Wittgenstein's nomenclature (1958: 88 ). Wittgenstein's philosophical output exemplified by the idea of the social nature of language developed in Philosophical Investigations, has had a tremendous influence on the analytic approaches to language as a social action, a classic example of which is the theory of speech acts, developed by John Searle (1969) , which has its roots in the ‗language games theory'. His major contribution might be that meaning ceased to be regarded as a relationship between language and the world, as in the referential view of meaning. Instead, meaning is located in social patterns of use, which are an integral part of social life.
Although the linguistic turn in philosophy at the beginning of the twentieth century laid the groundwork for numerous philosophical and intellectual movements, the new theories and concepts are, by definition, different from Wittgenstein's thought because each of them has its own complex ancestry and levels of resemblance, and most importantly, they reflect and incorporate new sociohistorical developments going far beyond the question of language per se. The most important new traditions committed to the philosophic investigations of language on which discourse analysis is based include hermeneutics, whose prominent representative is Hans-Georg Gadamer, social constructionism associated with Peter L. Berger, Thomas Luckmann and recently Kenneth J. Gergen, and poststructuralism, whose provenance is mainly French tradition of discourse analysis, represented by Michel Foucault and Jacques Derrida.
The concept of the linguistic turn would not be complete without briefly discussing the role of language in the hermeneutics which has its roots in the studies of sacred scriptureand is defined as the art of interpretation and understanding (Eagleton 1989: 57) . Hermeneutics developed through W. Dilthey, M. Hiedegger, to H.G. Gadamer, in particular, and came to be understood as interpretation of history and thought which rules out the possibility of arriving at the objective truth that transcends all viewpoints. Instead, the act of interpretation is rather -a gradual interplay between the subject-matter and the interpreter's initial position‖ (Lacey 1996: 135) .
Due to complex intricacies that the hermeneutic tradition shares with phenomenology we must look for the origins of Gadamer's hermeneutics inthe Husserlian philosophy (Moran 2002: 311) .The phenomenological movement, founded by Edmund Husserl, grew out of his dissatisfaction with and strong opposition to the reductive scientism, naive empiricism, and objectivism, bequeathed from Enlightenment philosophies, which he saw as an increasing threat to the Western civilization (Moran 2000:180) . In his book The Crisis of European Sciences and Transcendental Phenomenology (Husserl 1970: 211-215) , in which The Philosophical Underpinnings of Social Constructionist Discourse Analysis he aims his criticism at psychologism, Husserl claims that psychology failed to understand the essence of things or the essence of spirit due to attempting to apply scientific and empirical methods of the natural sciences to human issues. For this reason, Husserl developed phenomenology in order to -put the studying of the essence of spirit, the spiritual life, on a proper scientific footing‖ (Moran 2000:181) , to find a universal foundation of philosophy and science (Scruton 1995: 250-266) . Thus, phenomenological philosophy is, essentially, a return to solving fundamental problems of philosophy without resorting to prefabricated conceptions, so as to reach understanding of how the essence of things is grounded in the life-world (Moran 2000:181) . In order to facilitate seeking the essence of a phenomenon Husserl uses ‗bracketing', which, means placing one's own views about the phenomenon in suspension, enabling the interpreter to provide an exact description of the life-world (Smith, 1984: 96 ).
Husserl's student, Martin Heidegger, further elaborated on the concept of lifeworld. However, when Heidegger's first book, Being and Time (1927), was published, his conception of phenomenology proved to be different from that of Husserl (Audi 1999: 180) . He introduced his own re-conceptualization of the lifeworld and called it ‗being-in-the-world' (Heidegger 1966: 49) . Heidegger provided an alternative to the Husserlian phenomenology by dismissing its idea of presuppositionless philosophizing. He questioned the concept of bracketing as a means of reaching true knowledge, by making an assertion that contextualized prior knowledge or predetermined possibilities are always essential for human understanding to occur (Pollio, Henley, Thompson 1997: 47) . With his reinterpretations, Heidegger brought hermeneutical phenomenology into being, a new orientation within the phenomenological movement whose methods involve interpreting all spheres of life (Craig, E. 2005: 271) .
Language was an important theme of philosophical reflection for Heidegger, especially in his later essays published under the title On the Way to Language (Philipse 1998:204) , in which his conception of language underwent radicalization (Lafont 1999: 56) . In the essays, having admittedpartial validity of philosophical and scientific ideas regarding the concept of language as a tool for expression and communication (Philipse 1998:204) , Heidegger aims to instruct its readers on how to -‗inhabit' language as the house of Being‖. He echoed his famous statement from his -Letter on Humanism‖ (1946-7), saying, -Language is the house of Being. In this home man dwells‖ (quoted in Moran 2002:246),Heidegger, as interpreted by David Howarth, explains that human beings are simply -thrown into‖ and inhabit the world of Being where language makes it possible for them to conceive or think about objects in it (Howarth, Norval, Stavrakakis2000 : 3).
Heidegger's quest to systematically yield new insights into the world-disclosing function of language and to transform phenomenology into hermeneutics was continued later by his disciple (Lafont 1999: 56,76) ,Hans-Georg Gadamer, who Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1(2011): 155-171 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0007-4
actually explicitly declared to develop the Heideggerian project further (Gadamer 1977: 3) . In the book Truth and Method (1960), Gadamer introduces his account of the fundamental hermeneutic experience of understanding, which is internally linked with the Heideggerian analysis of understanding of ‗being-in-the-world' as formulated by Heidegger in his Being and Time (Lafont 1999: 76) . In his search for the possibilities of understanding, Gadamer concludes that understanding is always interpretive and linguistic; namely, it is always a matter of language that enables human beings to experience the world and social reality (Dostal 2002: 1) . As Gadamer puts it, -language is not just one of man's possessions in the world; rather, on it depends the fact that man has a world at all‖ (Gadamer 2006:440) . Gadamer, after Heidegger,also recognizes the importance of the historicity of understanding or the historicity of human knowledge (Gadamer, 1977:xv) , which means that human understanding always occurs within a narrative, ‗a linguistic framework', shaped by historically-conditioned social forces (Cooperrider and Michel Avital2004: 81 ).
Gadamer's version of hermeneutics as developed in Truth and Method ceased to be the art of text interpretation as traditionally-understood. By asking the philosophically fundamental question, -how is understanding possible‖ (Gadamer 1977 (Gadamer [2008 : xxvii), Gadamer transformed hermeneutics into philosophical hermeneutics (Ricoeur 1991: 59-62) , thus providing it with a new reflective dimension. Indeed, his focus on language as the medium of all human experience, encapsulated in his term ‗linguisticality of being', places Gadamer at the heart of the linguistic philosophical traditions.
The central role of language in creating reality as emphasised in the Gadamerian hermeneutic philosophy is also at the core of the more influential constructionist and poststructuralist discourse theories, which, as the name suggest, replace the notion of language with that of discourse. It is possible to identify several reasons for the emergence of the ‗second linguistic turn', or rather, the discursive turn that occurred towards the end of the 1960s (Wood and Kroger 2000: 191) . The first contributing factor was the growing dissatisfaction with positivism, voiced even by positivists themselves who criticized it for its incapability to provide an adequate account of the natural sciences (Velody and Williams 1998: 69) . The relevance of logical-positivistic orientation as applied to theorize the increasingly complex processes and practices in the social sciences were also questioned (Howarth 2008: 12) . Furthermore, there was a problem with finding a way to transpose the burning issues on how science is practised into an insightful explanation. (Velody and Williams 1998: 69) .The answer came with the publication ofThomas Kuhn's The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (1962) , in which Kuhn developed the concept -paradigm‖ to describe a theoretical framework within which a group of scientists are bound by the joint worldview, a common theory that relies on a set of shared assumptions and unanimously accepted The Philosophical Underpinnings of Social Constructionist Discourse Analysis practices (Swedin 2005: 154) . Furthermore, scientists working inside a discipline use a common language which defines the boundaries of what makes sense, which evokes Wittgensteinian observation that we are to some extent -captives of a picture‖ (Wittgenstein, 1958 , quoted in Debrix 2003 . Thanks to his influential, social construction-oriented book, Thomas Kuhn was credited with originating the modern view of the social studies of science (Hacking 1999: 42) , thus giving rise to the development of social constructionism.
Although social constructionism is predicated on various philosophical traditions, including that of Wittgenstein's and Husserl's, many scholars trace its roots to Berger and Luckmann'sThe Social Construction of Reality (1966) , which is regarded as the landmark achievement in the social constructionist movement (Gergen 1985:266) . In their treatise, Berger and Luckmann argue that society comes into being as a human product and is experienced as an objective reality which they define as -a quality pertaining to phenomena we recognize as having a being independentof our own volition (Berger and Luckman 1966:13) . In this view, the socially-constructed reality is taken for granted so that is appears -normal‖ and -self-evident‖. Next, Berger and Luckmann focus on and analyze the processes by which people construct the worlds of institutions, in other words, the processes of constructing symbolic realities. They conceptualized the term ‗symbolic universes' as one of the levels of legitimizing the order of a given social institution in order to illustrate how people account for the world through social interaction (1966: 92). The ‗symbolic universe' is a socially constructed symbol system that has a totalizing effect on different provinces of meaning in social realty, specifying what the nature of the world and the place of people and their creations within it are like (Jenkins 2004: 136) . As Berger and Luckmann put it, -the symbolic universe provides the ultimate legitimization of institutional order by bestowing upon it the primacy in the hierarchy of human experience‖ (1966: 98) .
For these two early social constructivists, language as the -most important sign system of human society‖ (1966:51). They view language as capable of making subjective meanings -real‖, that is, bringing to life the whole world that is beyond everyday experience. The process during which institutions, being social products, become parts of an objective reality as self-evident aspects of the world is called ‗objectivation'. At the same time, language typifies these meanings through ‗semantic fields' or ‗zones' of meaning, which, in turn, are ordered by vocabulary, grammar, and syntax (Berger and Luckmann 1966: 39) . However, they did not claim there is nothing beyond a socially constructed ‗reality', which places them among the supporters of the weaker form of social constructionism for whom social reality is saturated with by both social relations and material objects (Hacking 1999: 25) as opposed to those who claim that all reality, even physical world, is socially constructed. Lodz Papers in Pragmatics 7.1(2011): 155-171 DOI: 10.2478/v10016-011-0007-4
Given its ramifications for the development of discourse analysis approaches, poststructuralism, a part of a larger postmodern framework, is probably the most influential movement within the social constructionist paradigm. It emerged towards the end of the1960s as a critique of Saussure's structuralism and contributed significantly to the linguistic turn in social sciences, and reciprocally, a social turn within linguistics. Although poststructuralism covers a variety of intellectual trends, eg.,Lacan's psychoanalysis, Derrida's deconstruction, and Barthes's semiology, it is Foucault's concept of ‗discourse ' (1972) that received the greatest recognition in social research (Fairclough, Wodak, van Dijk) . One of the reasons for this is that Michel Foucault, a French historical philosopher, conceptualized a definition of discourse as an all-embracing, extending beyond language to operations of society, set of rule-governed statements that enable human beings to make sense of the world, and at the same time imposing limits on what gives meaning (Wetherell, Taylor, Yates 2005:390; Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 12) .
According to one of the most commonly used ways of classifying the Foucauldian theoretical output, Foucault's works can be divided into two phases or approaches:an early ‗archaeological' phase and a later ‗genealogical' phase. Despite this division, the two approaches can be treated as complementary.Archaeological investigations, to which his The Archaeology of Knowledge (1972) is devoted, are aimed at describing in what ways language statements (the smallest units of discourse) are historically privileged, that is, -accepted as meaningful‖ in a given period ofthe history of humanity (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 12) . While defining discourse, Foucault introduces another concept called discursive formations, which consists of sociohistoricallyconditioned systems of rules -deciding‖ whether certain statements can occur or be used at particular times, places, and institutional locations (Fairclough 2006: 40) . In other words, discursive formations make specific types of knowledge possible by governing what can be said, who can speak, when, and where.
When Foucault gives his account of knowledge and truth, it is far from being a reflection of reality. Truth is relative to a specific historical context, discursively constructed and subject to different regimes of knowledge, which in turn are sustained by various discursive formations (Hall 1997 , in Wetherell, Taylor, Yates 2005 ). Foucault investigates the circumstances under which statements are taken to be commonsensical knowledge: the statements that a society accepts and makes them function as true (Mills 2003: 74) .
Another important key theme in Foucault's philosophy is ‗subjectification', a process or social, historical, and political conditions through which individuals lose their own selves, simultaneously being created -anew‖ as subjects in a particular discursive formation.The discursively constructed subject must stay within a 164 MarekGralewski The Philosophical Underpinnings of Social Constructionist Discourse Analysis discourse position, adhere to its rules and conventions and live within the regime of power/knowledge sustained by the discursive formation (Foucault 1983: 212 ).
Foucualt's genealogical studies investigate processes in which discourse, through the complex interaction of knowledge and power, shapes historical conditions, which makes particular conceptual frameworks or structures of knowledge possible (Olssen, Codd, O'Neill 2004:47 ). Foucault's genealogy focuses on the specific nature of the relations between discourse and practice through which knowledge becomes invested with power (McLaren 2002:3) . The major Foucault's works written within the genealogical phase include Discipline and Punish(1995 [1975] ) and The History of Sexuality Volume One (1978 [1976] ).The Foucauldian conception of power, in which his main significance lies, does not conceive of power as a centralized and stabilized force.A group or an individual does not possess power; it is distributed through various levels of society (Foucault 1980: 119) . In Foucault's view, power is not only productive, but also positive as it plays an important role in putting individuals into relationships as various subjectivities, developing through discourse (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 13) .
To summarize, the poststructuralist theory of discourse as advanced by Foucault and other postmodern thinkersargues that reality is a discursively constructed social product in which truth is understood as -always contingent or relative to some discursive and cultural frame of reference‖ (Wetherell, Taylor, Yates 2005:393) . Indeed, as Rorty puts it, -truth cannot be out there -cannot exist independently of the human mind -because sentences cannot so exist, or be out there. The world is out there, but descriptions of the world are not‖ (Rorty 1989:5) . Poststructuralism reflects the so-called ‗crisis of representation' according to which truth is a feature of language.That is, representations of the world are considered do be merely products of particular sets of historical, local practices and, most importantly, embedded in sociocultural discourses (Howarth and Torfing 2005: 13-14) .
In response to an extremely relativist stance taken by poststructuralism, in which there is no reality beyond discourse and which makes assessment of competing knowledge claims irrational as any claim to truth can be valid, depending on one's perspective, a new -critical realist‖ approach to discourse analysis emerged (Fairclough 1995; Fairclough and Wodak 1997; Chouliarki and Fairclough 1999 ) as a meta-theoretical alternative to positivist and constructionist studies in the social sciences (Groff 2004: 1; Clegg 2006:14) . Initiated by the publication of A Realist Theory of Science (1975 Science ( , [2008 ) by Roy Bhaskar, critical realism has since become an international and multidisciplinary movement in philosophy and the human sciences (Archer and Bhaskar 1998: ix) .
In the face of relativity of knowledge and scepticism about the existence of the theory-independent world,partly influenced by the Kuhnian revolutionary conceptualization of social processes involved in the production of scientific knowledge, partly affected by the idea of theory-dependency of data description explored by Wittgenstein-inspired thinkers, Bhaskar undertook to solve the problem of how -to sustain a clear concept of the continued independent reality of being‖ (Archer and Bhaskar 1998: x) , or in the words relevant for social constructionist orientation, how to account for the existence of the reality that is not discursively constructed, ‗or separate from the ways in which we talk about them' (Wetherell, Taylor and Yates 2005: 393) . He concluded that if the supposed ‗incommensurability' of various theories relies on the conflict rather than difference, the theories must describe the same world using different terms, and if, thanks to its descriptions, one of the theories can give a better accountof a phenomenon than other methods, then there must be -a rational criterion for the theory choice‖. For this reason, critical realists embark on a quest to find a common ground for -ontological realism, epistemological relativism and judgmental rationality‖ (Archer and Bhaskar 1998: x) .
One of the essential features of critical realist theory is the transitive and intransitive dimension of knowledge, which also reflects the central principle of critical realism, namely, the independent existence of the world, which is outside our perception (Sayer A. 2000: 10) . Bhaskar argues that there are two fundamentally different dimensions of knowledge or science (Bhaskar (1975 (Bhaskar ( [2008 :xi), one dimension consists of ‗transitive objects', that is, socially and historically conditioned knowledge represented in theories, practices and discourses. The other dimension consist of ‗intransitive', non-discursive, mindindependent objects, ‗invariant to our knowledge of them ' (Bhaskar (1975 ' (Bhaskar ( , [2008 :12), which natural sciences attempt to study to acquire true knowledge (Wetherell, Taylor, Yates 2005:393) .
In order to make the above principles of critical realism relevant for critical social scientific theory and practice, Chouliarki and Fairclough (1999:32) theorize critical social science as having both a ‗transitive' and an ‗intransitive' object. Because the social practices, which are analyzed by critical social practitioners, have a material dimension, they constitute the intransitive object, whereas the conceptualizations used to pre-define these social practices are by definition theory-dependent, thus being the transitive object of critical social science.
Despite being regarded as constructive of social realities, language in critical realism is conditioned by pre-existing constraints being a part of the material world (Sims-Schouten,Riley andWillig 2007: 128). There is a complex interaction between discourse and non-discursive social structures, or material practices, which, in contrast to social constructionist approaches, are irreducible to discourse ordo not acquire meaning exclusively through discursive interpretation. Then, discourse along with material practices and causal mechanisms operating within society create a coherent relationship (Joseph and Roberts 2004:3) . Discourses that The Philosophical Underpinnings of Social Constructionist Discourse Analysis emerge within material practices are, at the same time, accommodated by them. Most importantly, these objective structures leave space forhuman agency, also referred to as ‗generative mechanisms' (Joseph and Roberts 2004: 2) , by offering various ways of being or reacting (Willig 1999 , quoted in Sims-Schouten, Riley andWillig 2007 .
To sum up, critical realism incorporates constructionist discourse analysis theory within a critical realist conceptual framework and provides it with another dimension in the form of non-discursive, material elements that constrain and facilitate discursive interactions.
Epistemological and ontological assumptions
So far, the epistemological and ontological assumptions of social constructionist paradigm remained mostly implicit in the paper. Therefore, this part of the article aims to provide a brief outline on how ontological questions of what there is, and epistemological ones of what can be known and how we can know it are addressed by social constructionist discourse theory and a critical realist approach to it.
Basically, social constructionist discourse theory, understood here as a broader category encompassing poststructuralism (following Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 6) , is deeply committed to an anti-essentialist ontology and anti-foundationalist epistemology (Howarth and Torfing 2005: 13) . The anti-essentialist ontology means that there is no referential connection between a word and an independent objective world that possesses essential properties. Interestingly, reality is constructed through discourse (Phillips and Hardy 2002: 81) . However, depending on what feature of social constructionist theory is emphasized, theorists, instead of the term ‗anti-essentialist', use the following reformulations: ‗relativist ontology' (Denzin and Lincoln 2005: 193) , intersubjective ontology (Dunne, Kurki and Smith 2007: 172) , or linguistic ontology (Tuffin 2005: 67) . Whereas, the antifoundationalist epistemology suggests that although describing the world is possible, claiming it as true is impossible due to the lack of its correspondence with an independent reality. Knowledge and, by the same token, truth are subjective, one of many possible interpretations of the world (Jørgensen and Phillips 2002: 6) . There are also other interpretations of this epistemological stance, including transactional and subjectivist epistemology.
Social constructionist discourse theory is a paradigm in the social sciences that is generally contrasted with positivism or rationalism that embraces a positivist epistemology and an empiricist ontology. In organisation studies (Clegg 2006: 40-41) and International Relations (Debrix 2003: 66-86) , where discourse analysis is used as one of different approaches, these two paradigms are considered as competing for being the only one that produces all valid knowledge. Critical realism, also applied as an approach to discourse analysis, appears to be a bridgebuilding theory between the two seemingly incommensurable paradigms with its relativist epistemology and critical realist ontology which, in comparison to the anti-essentialist one,includes such notions as intransitive structures and generative mechanisms (‗the real') through whichhuman beings are capable of bringing about change during actually occurring events (‗the actual') that can be perceived and understood in many different ways (‗the empirical') (Barry and Hansen 2008: 70).
Conclusion
This paper has served as an assembly of important philosophical and theoretical developments informing the social construction discourse analysis work that have occurred within the social sciences. The idea behind compiling, analysing, and synthesising the philosophical dimension underpinning discourse analysis was to highlight the importance of engaging in the meta-theoretical reflections, thus encouraging greater reflectivity in conducting discourse analysis research. More so because the ontological and epistemological assumptions form the very foundation of any scientific position as they point to fundamental questions in every science.
In conclusion, leaving philosophical problems to philosophers means absorbing underlying assumptions unreflexively, whereas understanding the philosophy of science behind the complexity of theories can help avoid theoretical inconsistency, thus improving the researcher's practice. Metatheorizing can raise theoretical consciousness, while discourse analysts develop research frameworks drawing on a variety of theoretical orientations, which can be sometimes based on mutually exclusive ontological or epistemological assumptions. More so because the current trend in both natural and social sciences to blur the boundaries among scientific disciplines or subdisciplines more often than not guided by hitherto conflicting and competing paradigms makes it even more pressing to find solutions on how to build theories so that their conflicting philosophical foundations can not prevent disciplines or subdisciplines from engaging in a complementary dialogue.
